ATM Security & NETs Security
Recently, Singapore has had a wave of ATM Frauds. Measures have been taken by banks to monitor and attempt to avoid ATM frauds as much as possible. If someone performs a fraud using a copy of your ATM card, chances are that the bank will issue you a new ATM card, and will reimburse you immediately the missing money.
What happens on NETs enabled machines?
Introduction
NETs enabled machine are all over
Singapore.
NETS was founded as a result of a need for a centralised e-Payment operator by Singapore's local banks: DBS, Keppel Bank, OCBC, OUB, POSB, Tat Lee Bank and UOB, in 1985.
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NETs enabled machines are machines that accept payment via the NETs network. All local banks ATM cards support NETs, which make these NETs enabled machine very convenient to use.
You can use NETs in government building when paying for various fees, in super markets and almost every shop in Singapore (notorious exceptions are food stalls and pubs or cafes). You can use NETs to pay your bills on SAM machines, or AXS machines. You can also top-up your public transport fare card using NETs. Now you can use NETs to pay for your cab fares too. NETs is basically everywhere and extremely convenient.
Problem with ATM cards
Most ATM cards are just a dumb storage media. On the magnetic strip of the card is
encoded such information as your bank ID and your bank account number among others.
Information encoded on your ATM card is not encrypted, and therefore anybody with a
magnetic card reader can swipe your card in, in order to copy it.
There is a little problem with reading ATM cards using off-the-shelf magnetic card reader. The driver of the magnetic card reader will validate the content of the card against the checksum to protect against read errors. ATM cards usually have an invalid checksum on purpose. So reading them with regular magnetic card readers will fail. In order to succeed, you have to have a lower-lever card reader, or a 'dumb card reader' that does not validate checksums.
Of course the card alone is not enough to perform a fraud. An attacker would also need the corresponding PIN. Recent ATM frauds are based on stealing the card information and the PIN at the same time. Some fraudsters have put a mini magnetic card reader just before the real ATM's card reader: when the victim slides-in his card into the ATM, the fraudster's reader reads the card, then when the card goes deeper the ATM card reader can read the card. It is completely transparent to the victim. The fraudster before hand has put a pin-hole camera in the corner of the ATM booth so he can record the victim's PIN while he types it.
Mitigating Factor
The biggest mitigating factor is the fact that every ATM has a CCTV camera attached
to it, so that anybody approaching the ATM will be seen and could potentially be
identified after a successful attack. Banks put in place specially shaped card
reader enclosures to make it easier for a phony card reader to be spotted by a
user.
Convenience vs. Security
While AXS stations seem to have a digital
camera, apparently it is only used to take digital pictures, which is used for
application like ePostcards. It does not appear to be CCTV like, in the sense that
it does not appear that it films every users while they approach or use the
machine.
SAM machines do not have cameras either. Almost all POS in Singapore do not have a CCTV camera or have a CCTV camera that cannot see if the cashier swipes the NETs card in the rightful reader or if he swipes it in a recording card reader device first. If such an employee (cashier, taxi driver, etc..) decides to become rogue and steal ATM card information it would be absolutely trivial, and the user would not notice, since he would not be the one sliding the card himself. Before the user realizes his card was misused, it would be too late, and he would have no idea which merchant is to blame.
Possible Solution
A possible solution would be to have a hardware token, very much like the ones
recently launched for Internet Banking by Singapore banks.
A user could use the same hardware token on ATMs. Before asking for the PIN, the ATM or POS would check if the card supports NETs. If it does, it would request for the hardware token displayed number instead of asking for the PIN. These hardware token displayed numbers are time dependent and cannot be re-used. A fraudster could still copy the card and film the user entering the number, it would become useless:
- The number cannot be reused
- The number would not be supported on foreign ATMs since it is not the usual PIN
If the card is a foreign card that does not support NETs and instead supports VISA, PLUS, or any other usual payment network, then the ATM would ask for the usual PIN and the protection would not apply.
A user of a Singaporean bank ATM card overseas would still have to enter his PIN. But at least using his card in Singapore, the user would face no risk (and neither would the bank or the merchant).
Conclusion
Although this solution would prove to be very effective (the only way to defeat it
is to steal/copy the card and the token, as opposed to just steal/copy the card and
watch the PIN), it would end-up being costly for the bank:
- Each ATM customer would require on hardware token (could be shared for his various cards: credit card, ATM card, Internet Banking)
- Bank would have to have an extensive support program in place to teach users how to use the token during the first few months of the transition